In Rwanda, stability sometimes comes before justice

New tensions in Rwanda are not the result of a failure by the Rwanda tribunal to deliver justice, but of the struggle for food and land, says Jeroen Corduwener.

In the article France and the Tutsi have to face justice in Rwanda too, Marcia Luyten argues that all those involved in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 should be put on trial internationally: not just the Hutu, but also the Tutsi who killed tens of thousands of Hutus, and international players like France.

Luyten bases her argument on the assumption that a repeat of '1994' can be prevented if the path of international justice is followed in Rwanda. This analysis and conclusion do not add up. First of all because justice is not an end in itself, and certainly not in a country where this could lead to destabilisation. And secondly because the greatest threat to Rwanda is not in its past, unresolved or not, but in poverty, and the shortage of land and food.

Liberator

The genocide was aimed at the Tutsi. Current president Paul Kagame and his RPF stopped the mass killings in 1994. Although there are questions about whether this was Kagame's principal goal, or just a means to get to power, it does not detract from the fact itself. Kagame took power as a dictator, but he has great authority precisely because he is seen as the liberator.

This is true in his own country but also at the international level: both the European Union and the United States treat Kagame with kid gloves. When Luyten makes the argument that the Netherlands can and should play a more critical role in Rwanda, she should know that the Netherlands is a relatively small donor and plays an accordingly minor role in the diplomatic game in Kigali.

Anyone wanting to investigate the crimes committed by the RPF threatens the stability, not only of Rwanda, but of the region as a whole. It is precisely the lack of stability that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives in the region over the past decades. It is a dilemma of justice versus stability. It is for these reasons that the US has blocked such an investigation by the Rwanda tribunal.

The US has taken over the role of France as the most important international player in Rwanda. The detrimental support from France for the previous regime is well-known, but remains without repercussions. The same scenario applies here as to the absence of an investigation into the RPF: geopolitical interests and diplomatic relations stand in the way of justice.

One people

Tutsi and Hutu have been united as ‘Banyarwanda’ by Kagame: ‘One people, one destiny' is the slogan that can be read on billboards in Kigali: pseudo-Marxism in miniature. Many Hutus feel their suffering has gone unnoticed, but it is incorrect to assume that this gives rise to a new generation of victims, with the ultimate result that the violence will be repeated, as Luyten writes. The largest group of forgotten victims are the Tutsi survivors of the genocide, who do not feel recognised as such.

All these Rwandans live together in one of the smallest and most densely populated countries in Africa. And that population is growing at a dizzying rate. In 1994, the country had four million inhabitants, there are currently over ten million, a number that will double in ten years' time. Rwanda is fertile, but it is unable to feed such a large population, despite all attempts at land reform and economic growth.

The new tensions arise only from this and they threaten stability and peace. The greatest dangers are the struggle for food, land and economic ownership. The large majority of the desperately poor will turn on the small group of rich. And it in turn will defend itself.

Ethnic relations could play a role in this, intensified by the linguistic divide between English and French speakers. But it will be a response, not the underlying cause. If the international community is really concerned about the future of Rwanda, it should focus on investing in eliminating that underlying cause.